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Although a century has passed since the inception of the state action
doctrine,' the meaning of "state action" remains obscure. The Supreme
Court's definitions of that term have generated widespread confusion
2
and provoked vigorous criticism. 3 Some commentators have concluded
that the state action decisions are simply ideologically inspired manipu-
lations of the doctrine.4 That suspicion has been fueled by the stark
contrast between the Warren Court's expansion5 and the Burger
Court's contraction6 of the contours of state action.
7
The conceptual disarray has been aggravated-and in the minds of
some critics can be explainedS-by changes in the factual contexts of
1. The doctrine was born in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court
there declared unconstitutional §§ 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which for-
bade racial discrimination with respect to inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other
places of public amusement. The Court held that although Congress could proscribe
state laws that required such discrimination, it could not forbid private individuals,
acting on their own initiative, from engaging in racial discrimination. Id. at 17-18.
2. Compare Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473, 477 (1962) (doctrine cannot be as broad as Court's language suggests) and
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 29
(1959) (state action cases lack rational theory of decision) with Nevin, State Action: The
Significant State Involvement Doctrine After Moose Lodge and Jackson, 14 IDAHo L.
Rav. 647, 674 (1978) (state action theory coherent).
3. Many commentators argue that the state action doctrine is analytically unsup-
portable and should be discarded. See, e.g., Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State
Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 893, 893-95 (1975); Horowitz,
The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL.
L. REv. 208, 208-09 (1957). Others contend that because state inaction can be an effective
method of abridging constitutional rights, the doctrine should be modified to require
positive state activity under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Black, The Supreme Court,
1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14,
81 HARv. L. RFv. 69, 108 (1967); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State
Action" Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLum. L. REv. 855, 855 (1966).
Even those commentators who support the Court's state action decisions acknowledge that
they are more readily explicable in public-policy than in doctrinal terms. See, e.g.,
Nevin, supra note 2, at 648; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 4-5,
57-58 (1961).
4. E.g., Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 361-63 (1977); Wechsler, supra note 2, at 29.
5. See pp. 541-44 infra.
6. See p. 544 infra.
7. The doctrinal shift has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars. See, e.g., Bassett, The
Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L.
REv. 39 (1972); Note, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840 (1974). One
commentator has attempted to correlate that shift with changes in the membership of
the Supreme Court. See Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional En-
forcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REv. 479, 505-06 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 3, at 4-5 ("state action" is shorthand for
balancing-of-interests test); Note, State Action and the United States Junior Chamber of
Commerce, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1407, 1414-15 (1975) (historical and economic reasons
for lower threshold of state action in equal protection cases).
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state action cases. Once aimed exclusively at state attempts to evade
substantive proscriptions of discrimination, 9 the cases recently have
begun to challenge the constitutionality of state procedural schemes,
irrespective of their substantive ends. 10 Courts have made little effort
to adapt theories of state action developed in the former context to the
latter. They have relied upon rigid categories of public-versus-private
activities instead of developing a coherent state action theory applicable
to conflicts over procedure." The Supreme Court's latest application
of the state action doctrine in the procedural context was the 1978
decision of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks.12 In that case the Court held that
self-help repossession under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
does not constitute state action and that due process requirements are
therefore inapplicable to such repossessions.'8
This Note contends that the Flagg Brothers Court erred by failing
to apply the "significant state-involvement" test of state action that has
been developed in equal protection cases. The Note demonstrates that
a state's decision to promote a particular procedural framework for
private action is a substantive decision and therefore must satisfy con-
9. See note 70 infra.
10. See note 71 infra.
11. E.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156-60 (1978); see notes 27-30, 100 infra
(citing cases).
12. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
13. Id. at 157-66. The case has been widely criticized. See, e.g., The Supreme Court,
1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REv. 57, 120-31 (1978) (rationale avoids important questions)
[hereinafter cited as Supreme Court Term]; 46 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 500 (1978) (lower
court decision correct).
A judgment as to the constitutionality of the Uniform Commercial Code's self-help
remedies had been long awaited, with commentators battling over the due process and
state action issues that such a challenge would present. The due process literature debates
both the public-policy justifications for allowing self-help remedies, compare White, The
Abolition of Self-Help Repossession: The Poor Pay Even More, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 503,
531 (cost of abolishing self-help repossession prohibitive) with Yudof, Reflections on
Private Repossession, Public Policy and the Constitution, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 954, 967-72
(1974) (benefits of abolition outweigh costs), and the doctrinal considerations, compare
Brabham, Sniadach Through Di-Chem and Backwards: An Analysis of Virginia's Attach-
ment and Detinue Statutes, 12 U. RiCH. L. REv. 157, 199 (1977) (Virginia attachment and
detinue provisions not violative of due process) with Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes
and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 372 (1973) (self-
help violates notice and hearing requirements). The state action literature debates the
doctrinal merits of finding state action. Compare Catz & Robinson, Due Process and
Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond,
28 RuTGERs L. REv. 541, 579-84 (1975) (theories for finding state action) and McCall, Due
Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-
Repossession and Adhesion Contract Issues, 26 HAsTiNGs LJ. 383 (1974) (repossession is
nondelegable state function) with Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and
Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment (pt. 3), 47 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 1,
54 (1973) (repossession is private function) and Note, State Action and the Constitution-
ality of U.C.C. § 9-503, 80 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 547, 573 (1973) (finding state action in
self-help repossession would make concept meaningless).
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stitutional norms. Applying this theory to self-help repossession under
the U.C.C., the Note concludes that, contrary to the Court's decision
in Flagg Brothers, such repossessions constitute state action.
I. Development of the State Action Doctrine
Many of the guarantees of individual rights enshrined in the Con-
stitution protect only against governmental abridgement.14 The sig-
nificance of that limitation first became apparent in 1883, when the
Supreme Court held in the Civil Rights Cases'5 that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant Congress the authority to proscribe purely
private acts of racial discrimination.' 6 Though Congress eventually
overcame that particular hurdle,' 7 the state action doctrine has re-
mained a barrier to the extension of various constitutional guarantees.' 8
A. Initial Ebb and Flow
The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the state action limita-
tion was narrow and inflexible; 19 nothing short of overt official in-
volvement or state-mandated activities sufficed to trigger Fourteenth
Amendment concerns.2 9 That interpretation seriously undercut the
14. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by their terms apply only to govern-
mental actions. First Amendment guarantees, as incorporated through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, also are applicable only to state actions. See Yackle,
supra note 7, at 489.
15. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
16. Id. at 11-12.
17. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-(6) (1976)), enacted under Congress's commerce power, con-
tains provisions nearly identical to those contained in the first two sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875. See Quinn, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF.
L. REv. 146, 150 (1976). The Act has survived constitutional challenges. See Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
18. See Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
Sup. CT. REV. 41, 44 (state action as barrier to development of constitutional obligation
to reduce economic inequality). Not all commentators have found this result undesirable.
See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 2, at 31 (courts should resist temptation to abandon state
action doctrine). Even so vociferous a critic of the state action doctrine as Professor Black
advocates that some individual actions be free from the constraints of the equal protec-
tion, due process, and free speech doctrines. Black, supra note 3, at 100-01.
19. Yackle, supra note 7, at 484-86 (doctrine "wooden").
20. Though the state action doctrine was not formally announced until the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), three earlier cases foreshadowed it. See United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639 (1882) (Congress cannot outlaw lynching because private
activity); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) ("prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment are addressed to the States"); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554
(1876) (Fourteenth Amendment "adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against




impact of the Civil War amendments. The states avoided the new
constitutional edicts by delegating important functions to private
parties and by encouraging, rather than requiring, racial discrimina-
tion by individuals.21
For sixty years, the Court tolerated those evasionary tactics. Not
until 1940 did the Supreme Court broaden the state action concept to
encompass acts other than those mandated by the state. In Smith v.
A llwright,22 the Court held that the acts of private individuals could
constitute state action when those acts became part of the "machinery"
by which the state performed its duties.23
A llwright spawned two theories of state action that were later used
to extend the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 One theory
21. See J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 338-43 (3d ed. 1967); R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUsTICE 60-65, 84-89 (1975). The classic use of that strategy was in the context of
primary elections. State legislatures delegated increasing amounts of power to political
parties in order to insulate efforts to nullify black suffrage from attacks under the Fif-
teenth Amendment. The tactic was effective for many years. See note 23 infra.
Prior to the approval of Jim Crow laws in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), states
encouraged other forms of private discrimination by repealing the common law duties of
innkeepers and common carriers to provide service to all who requested it. See Nerken,
sutIra note 4, at 317-18. After Plessy, such repeals occurred whenever needed to legitimate
merchants' refusals to serve blacks. See id. at 318-19. Evasion by delegation is not a his-
torical relic. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (striking down state con-
stitutional amendment barring open-housing legislation); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (placing public park in private hands not sufficient to evade desegregation).
22. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
23. Id. at 664. A1lwright was one of a long line of "white primary" cases. Recognizing
that white control over selection of the general-election candidates would vitiate black
suffrage, southern legislatures delegated the power to conduct primary elections to private
political parties in the hope that exclusion of blacks from primaries by those parties
would not be attributable to the state. Litigation over the strategy centered on the laws
of Texas. In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), the Court struck down a Texas
statute prohibiting blacks from participating in party primaries. Id. at 541. The Texas
legislature responded by authorizing the party executive committee to set the qualifica-
tions for voting in primaries. The Court then found the state implicated in the dis-
crimination because the committee was its agent for the purpose of determining voter
qualifications. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1932). The legislature's next effort
was more successful. In Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), the Court upheld the
right of a private political party, acting pursuant to a vote of its state convention, to
exclude blacks from its primaries. Id. at 54-55. Nine years later, despite the absence of
any new factual developments, the Court overruled that decision in Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944). In the last case of the series, the Court ruled that primaries run by a
private political party that had little contact with the state and that operated in only one
county must nevertheless be open to blacks. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953).
Elections continue to receive special protection in the state action decisions. See, e.g.,
Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (poll-watching a public function
and thus state action).
24. The original "official action" doctrine has survived, and its three elements-the
definitions of official, official act, and resulting from an official act-have gradually been
broadened. The first element to be expanded was the definition of a state official. In
1945, the Court overruled its decision in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), and held
that illegal actions undertaken by an official acting pursuant to his legitimate authority
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evolved into the public-function test; the other, into what has been
variously characterized as the "significant state-involvement," "state
encouragement," or "symbiotic relationship" test.
B. The Public-Function Test
The public-function theory of state action focuses on the nature of
the activity in question. Some activities, the Court has held, are so
inextricably intertwined with the proper functioning of the govern-
mental entity that they are deemed to be state functions regardless of
how or by whom they are performed. 5 For example, the conduct of
elections, 20 the operation of parks27 and schools, 28 and the management
constituted state action. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1945). Some judges
have attempted to extend that doctrine so that the conduct of individuals blatantly disre-
garding the limits of their authority, though for reasons tangentially related to that
authority, constitutes state action. See, e.g., Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 505 F.2d
547, 556 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (bail
bondsmen pretending to be state policemen should establish state action).
The definition of a state act has also been enlarged. Traditionally, the "purely ministe-
rial acts of 'minor governmental functionaries'" have been disregarded in state action
determinations. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring)). A
recent decision, however, appears to base a finding of state action on precisely such acts.
See Dieffenbach v. Attorney Gen., 604 F.2d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 1979) (court clerk's issuance
of writ "apparently" enough to warrant state action finding).
The temporal nexus, too, has been widened. All acts that follow directly from an
official act are now attributed to the state actor. See, e.g., McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d
509, 512 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Baker v. McCollan, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979)
(attribution from deputized officers to sheriff); Stypmann v. City & County of San
Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977) (imposition of garagemen's lien sub-
sequent to towing car at request of state police officer held state action); Tedeschi v.
Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 41-42 (D. Conn. 1976) (same).
25. E.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1946) (operation of business district
in company town is state action). For a discussion of the public-function theory and its
problems, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALI LAW § 18-5, at 1163-67 (1978). For an
interesting suggestion as to how judges should deal with the public-function argument,
see Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 146 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring) (doc-
trine is evolving concept based on social needs).
26. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 664 (1944); Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F. Supp. 822, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
27. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966). Evans remains an isolated example of
application of the public-function doctrine in a recreational context. In a subsequent
decision upholding the closing of public pools in the face of a desegregation order, the
Court avoided the public-function argument entirely. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
220-24 (1971). Although the Court has barred city officials from permitting private
segregated-school groups to use public recreational facilities, Gilmore v. City of Mont-
gomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), the rationale for the decision was that grants of access con-
stituted impermissible state aid to segregated schools, id. at 570 n.10.
28. E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1964); Bush v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 44-45 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961). The
Court has described the provision of schooling as "perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments," Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
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of central business districts29 must always comport with constitutional
standards. Though recent cases have not challenged the premises of
the public-function theory, they have cut back substantially on the
number and type of functions deemed public.30
C. The Significant State-Involvement Theory
The second state action theory focuses on the government's involve-
ment in a particular activity. This theory rests on Smith v. Allwright's
declaration that state establishment of a procedure that entrusts private
parties with certain powers can be construed as state endorsement of
the manner in which those parties exercise that power.3 1 According to
this theory, ostensibly private actions are attributable to the state if
they occur within a governmental framework that has so encouraged
them that the state can be deemed responsible for the acts.32 States
(1954), and has been especially harsh on efforts to maintain segregated schools. In addition
to applying the public-function theory in cases such as Griffin and Bush, the Court has
struck down every type of state aid to segregated schools on the ground that no matter
how trivial its fiscal impact, such aid constitutes significant state involvement in a dis-
criminatory activity. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (use
of public recreational fields); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (school textbook
lending program worth $6 per student).
29. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (business district in company-owned town).
The Court refused to extend the doctrine to include a common analogue of business
districts, the shopping center, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), although it had initially done so for First Amendment
reasons in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
30. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 904-06 & nn.36-37 (criticizing Court's manipulation
of public-function doctrine); cf. Note, Caveat Venditor: Greater Restriction of Remedial
Self-Help in Consumer Transactions, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. Rav. 756, 765-71 (1975) (discussing
implications for due process cases of cutback in public-function doctrine). In addition to
retrenchment in the First Amendment context, see note 29 supra, and unwillingness to
apply the parks doctrine to other recreational facilities, see note 27 supra, the Supreme
Court has been unresponsive to pleas for expansion of the doctrine into new areas. See,
e.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978) (self-help remedies); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-54 (1974) (public utility); Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119-21 (1973) (broadcast
journalism). The Court has also restricted the language of the public-function test.
Whereas the Court previously had required only that the defendant have exhibited "at-
tributes of government," Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring),
or have opened "up his property for use by the public in general," Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946), it now requires functions to be those "'traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state,'" Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)); cf. id. at 172-73 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (exclusivity test not required or supported by precedent).
31. Smith v. Allvright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944).
32. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("vital requirement is State responsibility"); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451, 462 (1952) (approval of musical broadcasts on public buses constitutes state action);
Catz & Robinson, supra note 13, at 573-79 (private acts state action if "clothed" with
state authority).
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may, in short, encourage only private conduct that comports with the
Constitution.33
The critical determination under this theory is at what point the
state's involvement in an activity warrants imposition of constitutional
constraints. In the 1960's, the Supreme Court moved toward requiring
that all discriminatory activities affected by some governmental frame-
work conform to constitutional standards.34 That approach, however,
would ultimately have obliterated the distinction between private and
state actions.35 Unwilling to take that step,36 the Burger Court retreated
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis37 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.38 by adopting the requirement that a "close nexus" exist between
the general governmental framework and the specific activity chal-
lenged before state action could be found.39
33. Alexander, supra note 3, at 907-09 (state encouragement of unconstitutional activi-
ties forbidden); see, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967); Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
34. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970) (enforcement of
trespass law unconstitutional because of discriminatory purpose); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (state must act to forbid discrimination if pervasive
interdependence exists); cf. Silard, supra note 3, at 855 (Court moving in 1969 toward
replacing state action doctrine with affirmative state obligation to promote equality).
35. Obliteration would occur because no private action is totally unaffected by govern-
mental influences. The pervasiveness of government regulation and subsidization would
be enough to make almost all private activity state action under this test. Burke & Reber,
State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment (pts. 1-2), 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1113-14 (1973); cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 n.7 (1974) (listing wide range of regulated activities).
Some commentators have argued that mere governmental acquiescence in a private
decision is a form of state action. Leaving an area open to private ordering does not
relieve the state of responsibility for enforcing those choices once made. As illustrated in
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of restrictive housing covenant
state action), that responsibility can require the state to enforce private choices that
violate constitutional norms. Because even "private" actions depend upon government
enforcement mechanisms, governmental acquiescence in an activity thereby involves the
government in that activity. For a fuller exposition of this theory, see Alexander, supra
note 3, at 894-99; Horowitz, supra note 3, at 208-09. Many commentators have supported
this expansive interpretation of the state action doctrine, e.g., Silard, supra note 3, at
872, though it has perturbed others, e.g., Supreme Court Term, supra note 13, at 127.
36. Some commentators have linked this reluctance to the Court's commitment to
values of federalism and judicial restraint. See p. 538 suPra.
37. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
38. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
39. In the leading state action case preceding Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972), the Court described the significant state-involvement test as an ad hoc one:
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). Accordingly, the plaintiff in Moose Lodge based his
state action claim on the state's grant of a license to, and corresponding regulation of,
the club being challenged. 407 U.S. at 171. The Court rejected that argument on the
grounds that the state's involvement in no way fostered or encouraged racial discrimina-
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The close-nexus requirement went beyond the Court's existing sig-
nificant state-involvement test by requiring more than extensive regula-
tion of an activity.40 The regulation had to bear a direct causal rela-
tionship to the challenged aspect of the activity. 41 The Court rejected
the position that interdependence of state and private actions in one
aspect of an activity necessarily implicated the state in all aspects of
that activity.42
To date the close-nexus test has been applied only as a negative
requirement-that is, as the basis for rejecting claims of state action.43
The potential positive attributes of the close-nexus requirement remain
unexplored. Those attributes can be developed by closer analysis of
the significant state-involvement test.
II. Provision of a Procedural Framework as State Action
The significant state-involvement test historically has been invoked
only in the face of pervasive interaction between the state and the
private parties participating in the challenged activity. Moose Lodge
and Jackson added a second tier to that barrier: the requirement of a
close nexus. Though the exact requirements of that test are uncertain,
analysis of past cases and the Court's treatment of those cases in Moose
Lodge and Jackson provides some guidance.
tion and that the state reaped no benefits from it; the state therefore could not be held
responsible for the discriminatory activity. Id. at 175-77.
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the constitutional challenge
to a public utility's termination procedures suggested two bases for a finding of state
action: the extensive regulation of the utility by a state agency, id. at 350, and the
agency's approval of the challenged termination procedures, which were included in a
state-required tariff, id. at 354-55. The Court rejected both claims and held that the
utility's procedures did not constitute state action. Id. at 358-59. The nexus between the
agency's regulatory power and the utility's termination procedures was not sufficiently
close to implicate the state in the utility's conduct. Id. at 351-54. The tariff itself could
not provide that nexus because the agency never analyzed the portion that contained
the termination procedures. Id. at 354-55. Inclusion of those procedures in the tariff"amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized
to employ such a practice if it so desired." Id. at 357; cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1976) (utility tariff not sufficient grounds for claiming state action
defense in antitrust suit).
These two cases together represented a profound shift in the significant state-involve-
ment branch of state action doctrine. Yackle, supra note 7, at 509, 516-17.
40. See note 39 supra.
41. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
42. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
43. The Supreme Court has decided only three cases under the close-nexus test:
Moose Lodge, Jackson, and Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The plaintiff lost
in each. For a survey of lower court decisions that have applied the test, see Nevin,
supra note 2, at 651-66.
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A. Pervasive Interaction
Pervasiveness of interaction is determined by both the number and
the extent of contacts between a state and the ostensibly private
activity.44 The contacts can assume a variety of forms: financial sub-
sidies that aid or direct an activity,45 regulations that shape the manner
in which the activity is performed,46 or licensing procedures that con-
strain the activity.47 The more complete the government's actual or
potential control of the activity, the greater is the likelihood that the
interaction will be deemed pervasive.
48
B. Close Nexus
The close-nexus test adds to the state action doctrine the requirement
that government involvement with the private activity must directly
encourage that aspect of the activity alleged to be unconstitutional.
4
Despite the fluctuations in the state action doctrine,o a consensus as
to what constitutes government encouragement of a private activity
has existed since the enunciation of the significant state-involvement
test in Smith v. Allwright.51 The Court has identified two general
methods of encouragement, each corresponding to a basis of state
power: legitimation, and control of private ordering.
44. See Nevin, supra note 2, at 666-71 (describing contacts meeting nexus requirement).
45. The subsidy can be monetary, see, e.g., Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir.
1976) (receipt of federal funds); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees,
Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975) (program grants), or in-kind, see, e.g., Gilmore v. City
of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (use of public recreational fields); Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (school textbooks).
46. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (regulation of
public utility); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (regulation of election procedures).
47. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (broadcast license); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (liquor
license).
48. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (finding of state
action more likely if government regulation extensive and detailed); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 174-75 (1972) (distinguishing Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), on pervasiveness of contacts); Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 453
F. Supp. 401, 420 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (extensive regulation increases probability of finding
state action).
49. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (failure to
establish nexus between regulation and challenged private act defeats state action claim);
New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858 (2d Cir.
1975) (failure to relate federal grants to sexist membership policy defeats state action
claim); Yackle, supra note 7, at 517 (courts require close connection between state action
and challenged conduct).
50. See pp. 540-45 supra.




Legitimation is the process by which the government places its im-
primatur on a particular activity5 2 It usually takes the form of explicit
statutory approval. 53 In some cases, however, the interaction between
the state and the private activity is so complete that the state's failure
to disapprove the challenged action can be deemed to be deliberate
and thus to constitute legitimation. 4
The theory behind the legitimation approach to state action analysis
is often couched in metaphysical terms. 55 The Court's underlying ob-
52. Legitimation has been the basis for a finding of state action in a number of cases.
See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). The Court
provided the clearest statement of the legitimation test in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354-57 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1967) (enactment of barrier to
open-housing laws considered express authorization of private right to discriminate);
Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952) (streetcar company's use of
piped-music system in buses constitutes state action because regulatory agency dismissed
investigation of practice after favorable report).
54. The Court has found the interaction sufficiently pervasive in only two cases: Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 725 (1961). Reitman involved more than mere inaction or failure to regulate,
for the state had, by popular referendum, enacted a constitutional amendment repealing
open-housing legislation and forbidding enactment of similar legislation. In light of the
amendment's political context, the California Supreme Court concluded that the amend-
ment constituted explicit constitutional authorization of discrimination, and the Supreme
Court adopted that finding. 387 U.S. at 376. The obvious evasionary intent led the Court
to overcome its reluctance to allow inaction to be the basis of a state action finding. Id.;
see note 57 infra (role of intent in state action decisions).
Burton is a more difficult case to explain, in part because the decision was significantly
different from the Court's subsequent restatement of it. The actual decision merely
speculated that the state might have profited from its lessee's discriminatory practices.
365 U.S. at 725. The Court subsequently seized upon that possibility to argue that the
state's pecuniary interests explained and tainted its permissiveness. See Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972); cf. Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc.,
607 F.2d 589, 596 (3d Cir. 1979) (state racing commission not in symbiotic relationship
with private racetrack because not joint venturer for profit). In short, to the extent that
failure to disapprove an action constitutes a continuing variant of the legitimation theory
of state action, only a showing of definite evasive intent brings it into play.
55. A number of judges argue that silent advocacy of actions that violate constitutional
norms, even if more apparent than real, undermines the state's commitment to the Con-
stitution and should be forbidden. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973)
(Constitution obligates state to avoid appearance of aiding segregated academies); Shirley
v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 746 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (Kauf-
man, C.J., dissenting) ("clothing" unconstitutional actions with legitimacy "utterly in-
consistent" with state obligations). This concern has been greatest in cases involving racial
discrimination. For instance, in Norwood, the Court held unconstitutional a state school-
book lending program that granted private segregated academies books worth $6 per
student per year. Though the Court spoke of the program as "giving significant aid" to
those academies, the de minimis financial impact of the program, coupled with the Court's
acknowledgment that no actual supportive impact had been found, 413 U.S. at 465, made
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jection, however, is eminently practical: authorization promotes eva-
sion of constitutional commands.5 Legitimation of nongovernmental
alternatives to various public activities has long been the central
vehicle for evading proscriptions of governmental discrimination. 7
Moreover, legitimation can have a publicizing effect: authorization of
private discriminatory action may increase public awareness of that
option. s
2. Control of Private Ordering
A second method of encouragement is state manipulation of osten-
sibly private systems of ordering. A private system of ordering is that
system of relationships and pattern of actions created by the free choice
of autonomous individuals. 9 The U.C.C. is the paradigm of a private
clear that the Court was primarily concerned with the moral support signified by the
program.
According to some commentators, the race cases have invoked a lower threshold for
finding state action. See, e.g., Nevin, supra note 2, at 674. Norwood is an excellent illustra-
tion of how that lower threshold can be reached while remaining within the confines of
a generalized state action test. The Court cited Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), for the proposition that any discrimination will pervade the entire educational
experience; any aid to a segregated school thus aids discrimination. 413 U.S. at 469-70.
By contrast, the Court maintained that aid to parochial schools violates the First Amend-
ment establishment clause only if used to support the religious classes; the religious
atmosphere of a school does not pervade the entire educational process. Id. That dis-
tinction enables the Court to emasculate the close-nexus test in race cases by a judicial
sleight-of-hand: any nexus is assumed in that context to be a close nexus.
56. See, e.g., Black, supra note 3, at 73 (inaction most efficient way to deny protection);
Quinn, supra note 17, at 152-55 (removing inaction as basis of state action finding is
overly broad restriction leading to anomalous results).
57. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 383 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Nerken,
sutra note 4, at 316-20 (discussing state's role in corporate decision to segregate rail-
road). The problem of evasion has proven particularly vexing because the distinction
between state and private action often appears to be strictly one of form. The Court
has generally detected and frustrated evasionary tactics. See note 23 supra (white
primary cases); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (transfer of ownership of
segregated park from municipality to private board of trustees insufficient change to
avoid duty to desegregate); Black, supra note 3, at 84-91 (discussing Court's response to
evasion); Yackle, supra note 7, at 486-89 (discussing impact of evasion on state action
doctrine). But cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 220 (1971) (closing public swimming
pools in face of desegregation order not unconstitutional); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435,
445 (1970) (dissolution of trust that owns park sufficient to avoid desegregation order).
58. See Catz & Robinson, suPra note 13, at 582. Despite the apparent acceptance of
this argument in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the claim has been advanced
without success in the creditor's remedies context, see, e.g., Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d
1107, 1111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974) (encouragement indirect and highly
conjectural).
59. See, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J., con-
curring) (area with no interest for collective society); Burke & Reber, supra note 35, at
1016-17 (1973) (freedom of individuals to structure their affairs); Supreme Court Term,
suPra note 13, at 129-30 (system of private acts and relationships). Even the most vociferous
critics of the state action doctrine agree that some genuinely private systems of ordering
exist and should be preserved. See, e.g., Black, supra note 3, at 100-03; Van Alstyne &
Karst, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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system of ordering. It establishes a framework within which private
parties can resolve contractual disputes on their own terms.
Ideally, the governmental framework within which private choices
are made would be neutral-that is, no governmentally created factors
should induce an individual to choose one alternative over another.
The private nature of the choice is destroyed when governmental in-
centives skew the framework toward a particular outcome. 0°
The state engages in manipulation whenever it weights particular
factors that enter into private calculations so as to tilt the balance
toward a particular outcome.0 ' The state can accomplish that manipula-
tion in a number of ways: by erecting procedural barriers to the dis-
favored outcome, 62 by eliminating barriers to the preferred outcome, 03
or by providing financial incentives that promote the preferred out-
come.0 4 Such schemes are often subtle, maintaining the illusion of
private choice long after the combination of government incentives
and disincentives has made every choice but one practically untenable0 3
Any governmental framework has some nonneutral effects on private
activities undertaken with reference to it.00 Some additional element
therefore is necessary to prevent all private activity from being deemed
60. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972) (no state action
when liquor regulations have neutral effect on discriminatory policies) with Burton V.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) (state action when discrimination
necessary to pay rentals established by state). Though the Court in Burton never found
explicitly that the lessee's discrimination was needed to generate the state's rental fees,
the Court has so explained that case since its establishment of the "close-nexus" test. See
note 54 supra.
61. The Court has referred to that phenomenon as "fostering" an outcome. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (no fostering because lack of
nexus); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972) (possession of liquor
license did not foster membership policies).
62. E.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390-92 (1969) (city charter amendment pre-
venting implementation of open-housing ordinance without referendum); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (requirement of constitutional amendment to enact fair-
housing laws).
63. E.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state repealed open-housing statutes);
Smith v. Allvright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (state changed laws regulating political party to
make discrimination legally possible).
64. E.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (support for segregated
schools through provision of athletic facilities); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973)
(support for segregated schools through provision of textbooks).
65. Compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 245-46 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(state refusal to outlaw segregated restaurants meant restaurants had to be segregated)
and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (financial viability of
municipal parking garage required lessee restaurant to segregate) with Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (liquor license unrelated to membership policies).
66. Without the provision of such necessities as sewers, police protection, water,
electricity, and other municipal services, few institutions could survive. At a very gen-
eralized level, therefore, the state supports all private activities. See note 35 supra; Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (any state-benefit or state-regulation test
would emasculate doctrine because state furnishes many municipal services).
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state action. 7 That element is provided by the requirement that the
private choice be the direct result of the government's pervasive in-
volvement in the activity. Pervasiveness of interaction not only
strengthens the government's control over the activity and magnifies
any encouraging effects, but also indicates the scope of the govern-
ment's interest in, and involvement with, the activity. The greater
that interest and involvement, the more likely it is that the effects of
that involvement are necessary outgrowths of the state's attempt to
order the whole activity.68 Any encouragement, though perhaps not
the result of a conscious government decision, will be an integral part
of the complex, symbiotic relationship between the activity's private
performers and governmental sponsors. It is this intent to shape an
activity in a way that makes the challenged outcomes more probable,
if not certain, that makes a governmental framework constitute state
action. 69
67. Van Alstyne & Karst, suPra note 3, at 33-34; see Burke & Reber, supra note 35, at
1114 (generalized impact test would destroy state action distinction). The Court's recogni-
tion of that danger led to adoption of the close-nexus test. See pp. 544-45 supra.
68. See p. 546 supra. In the case of the U.C.C., for example, governmental provision
of a comprehensive framework for the ordering of private commercial contracts has
eliminated the need for parties to bargain over specific terms. Failure to utilize the system
would require parties to incur enormous additional costs. In these circumstances, the
governmentally established framework, though not mandatory, virtually eliminates the
use of alternative, privately established systems of ordering.
69. In order to justify expansions of the state action theory in race cases, the Court
seized on the presence of an intent to evade the dictates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. See note 23 supra (expansion of doctrine to prevent evasion of Fifteenth
Amendment through primary elections); note 54 suPra (inaction as legitimation in cases
of overt discriminatory intent). Though the emphasis upon intent has sometimes resulted
in questionable decisions, see note 35 supra (reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), could obliterate public/private distinction); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 492-94
(1953) (Minton, J., dissenting) (majority's logic could signal end of all political interest
groups), it has proven to be the best method of determining the impact of ostensibly
permissive laws, see L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 18-2, at 1150-51 (ambiguity of state inaction
creates analytic problems for state action tests); Alexander, suPra note 3, at 901 (motiva-
tion relevant because effect of permissive frameworks ambiguous).
The intent test has played the opposite role in due process cases, in which courts have
based findings of no state action on the absence of such evasionary intent. See, e.g., Jack-
son v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 n.17 (1974) (no suggestion in record
that Utility Commission "intended either overtly or covertly to encourage the practice");
Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D. Conn. 1979) (procedure established in patients'
bill of rights exempt from due process review because adopted to curb greater abuses).
The search for evasionary intent per se in due process cases is almost invariably futile.
The conscious desire to violate constitutional commands present in racial discrimination
cases is usually absent from the due process cases; in the latter, the violation is often an
inadvertent consequence of advancing other social goals. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 342 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (discussing economic and administrative benefits of self-help
remedies); Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F. Supp. 903, 909 (D. Conn. 1979) (procedure established
in patients' bill of rights exempt from due process review because adopted to curb greater
abuses). The fact that these constitutional violations are inadvertent does not excuse
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C. Establishment of a Procedural Framework as Significant
State-Involvement
State action cases historically have focused upon the government's
role in influencing private parties' substantive decisions to practice
racial discrimination. Though it was the state's end that was objection-
able, the cases turned upon whether the means utilized by the state to
accomplish that end could be deemed to constitute state action.70
In recent years, state action cases increasingly have involved due
process challenges to the procedures that private parties employ to
reach decisions that are substantively unassailable.71 If a procedure
fails to meet constitutional norms, however, the decision to utilize it
is itself an objectionable substantive decision. The question presented
is identical to that posed in the first context: whether the means
utilized by the state to encourage private parties to rely upon the
procedure can be deemed to constitute state action. The significant
state-involvement test is equally applicable to this new context.
1. Pervasive Interaction
The bare establishment of a procedure is not enough to constitute
significant state involvement. The government must have sufficient
control over the activity to encourage the use of that procedure-that
is, the procedure must be part of a general framework of government
regulation. The more comprehensive the regulation and the more
control the government exercises over the activity, the more likely
there are to be governmental incentives to use the procedure. As the
government's involvement in an activity grows, moreover, the likeli-
hood increases that the results represent tacit government policy.7 2
them; what matters is the necessary consequence of the state's encouragement, not the
underlying motive. The Court must ask, not whether the state intended to violate the
Constitution, but rather whether it intended to shape a private party's conduct in a
way that would lead to such violations.
Courts can discover intent to shape private conduct through the same indicia that they
have used to infer evasionary legislative intent: pervasive interaction and symbiosis. See
note 48 supra (pervasiveness as indication of intent to control); note 54 supra (symbiosis
as indication of intent to control).
70. In most state action cases of recent decades, the practice under review was con-
ceded to be discriminatory; the issue for the Court was whether the private actor was
bound by the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
71. E.g., Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehousemen's lien enforcement
procedures); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility termination
procedures); see Nevin, supra note 2, at 649-53 (surveying challenges to self-help seizure);
id. at 665-66 (surveying challenges to utility termination procedures).
72. See note 69 supra; Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 341 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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2. Close Nexus
Though establishment of a procedure may directly affect a sub-
sequent decision, 73 that establishment need not influence all facets of
the procedure utilized; large areas may be left to private choice.
74
Accordingly, the existence of a close nexus between the procedures
established and the actions challenged is highly relevant.
As the government becomes more intimately involved with the de-
tails of the enactment, the claim that inclusion of certain details and
exclusion of others did not represent an intentional policy choice be-
comes untenable.75 Government participation can be deemed to legiti-
mate the procedure adopted.
Government establishment of a procedure can interfere with private
ordering on two levels. First, the procedure may be skewed to encour-
age a particular substantive choice.7 6 Alternatively, the government
may skew the framework within which the procedure operates so as to
encourage the procedure's use irrespective of the substantive implica-
tions; employing the procedure may itself constitute a substantive
policy promoted by the government.
77
In sum, whether the government's establishment of a procedure to
be utilized by private parties constitutes state action depends upon both
73. See pp. 554-55 infra (effect of establishment of U.C.C. on decision to rely upon
self-help remedies).
74. The "procedure" established may consist of no more than a general authorization
of a certain type of procedure, see, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 357 (1974) (tariff merely reserves right to terminate for nonpayment), or may ex-
plicitly leave some aspects of the procedure open to private ordering, see, e.g., Northrip
v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 31-32 (6th Cir. 1975) (federal mortgage
regulations left foreclosure proceedings to private lenders).
75. The government usurps private ordering by reducing the number of alternatives
open to private choice; in the extreme case-compulsion-the government reduces the
number of available choices to one. The greater the number of options the government
eliminates, the clearer it becomes that the government favors the remaining ones. Cf.
Male v. Crossroads Assocs., 469 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1972) (inferring state intent to
regulate tenant selection procedures from antidiscrimination clauses in management
contract).
76. The white-primary laws, see note 23 supra, are examples of this type of skewing.
Such laws involved the deliberate establishment of election procedures that made ex-
clusion of blacks easier, more effective, and therefore more attractive to racist political
groups. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 662-64 (1944) (segregated party mem-
bership and primaries given favored position in electoral process). The laws skewed the
general election results toward white-supported candidates. Cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461, 469-70 (1953) (only candidates of whites' party won general elections).
77. The creditors' remedies provisions of the U.C.C. exemplify the promotion of a
procedure as an end in itself. See pp. 554-57 infra. The model-procedure provisions in
some of the other 69 uniform laws adopted since enactment of the Code are similar in




the nature of the procedure and the relationship between that pro-
cedure and the challenged activity. The significant state-involvement
test provides the appropriate analytic vehicle for addressing that ques-
tion.78
III. Flagg Brothers Revisited
The Supreme Court's decision in Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,79 that a
warehouseman's use of state-established procedures to convert his lien
into good title involved no state action, threatens to emasculate the
significant state-involvement test. 0 The activity at issue in Flagg
Brothers-use of a procedure provided in U.C.C. section 7-210-was
part of a broad state scheme of commercial regulation. The Court's
establishment of state compulsion as a prerequisite to finding state
action ignored the post-Allwright doctrinal evolution, including the
Burger Court's own significant state-involvement decisions. State action
can exist even when the procedural framework is permissive.
78. In dismissing due process challenges to U.C.C. remedies for lack of state action,
courts have skirted the issue of significant state involvement. Despite the Court's ap-
plication of the encouragement theory of state action in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action found), some circuits have blithely declared that
that theory cannot be used in the due process context. See Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 332-33 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Note,
supra note 30, at 771-72.
The avoidance seems to result from concern that application of the theory in due
process cases would subject to constitutional review every private decision affected by
some statute. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 332-33 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1006 (1974); Burke & Reber, supra note 35, at 1109; Note, supra note 13, at 572-73.
That concern is unwarranted. The decision in Moose Lodge demonstrates that the
significant state-involvement theory need not reach all private activity even in the context
of racial discrimination. See note 39 suPra (discussing Moose Lodge); pp. 554-55 infra
(comparing Jackson with Flagg Brothers). But see note 55 supra (mechanism exists to
escape close-nexus limitation in race cases). Far from reenacting the conceptual debacle
of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), see note 35 supra (Shelley rationale obliterates
public/private distinction), the significant state-involvement test effectively distinguishes
between situations in which the government consistently structures, a private response
from those in which it acquiesces in a private decision.
Once a court finds that, by interfering directly in the decisionmaking process, the
state has substantially eliminated private choice, the fact that such interference violates
one constitutional imperative rather than another should be irrelevant. The state action
requirement in each case is derived from the same section of the Constitution. No rationale
justifies interpreting that section differently simply because it is to be applied to state
infringement of different rights.
79. 436 US. 149 (1978).
80. The respondents' brief in Flagg Brothers lumped the public function and en-
couragement arguments under one heading. Brief for Respondents at i, Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The resultant disorganization was primarily at the expense of
the significant state-involvement doctrine. See id. at 34-40.
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A. Section 7-210 of the Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code was the culmination of decades of
collaboration by lawyers, scholars, and legislators to mold the diverse
and often conflicting strands of commercial law into a coherent
whole.81 It attempts to streamline the commercial process by defining
and regulating every aspect of commercial contractual relationships.
82
Section 7-210, the provision at issue in Flagg Brothers, follows the
rest of the Code and merely establishes a presumption that the pro-
cedure set forth in the Code should be used by warehousemen to con-
vert their liens into good title. That presumption can be rebutted by
specific, conflicting contractual provisions.8 "2 In the absence of such
provisions, however, section 7-210 defines the rights and responsibilities
of the contracting parties.8 4 The contract between Flagg Brothers and
Shirley Brooks contained no conflicting provisions.85
Unlike the situations in Moose Lodge and Jackson, the challenged
actions of the defendant in Flagg Brothers were explicitly authorized
by the terms of the pervasive governmental regulations.80 Moreover,
81. The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted over a period of twenty years and
underwent extensive revisions. See Schnader, Foreword to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, I
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE X-Xi (1976) (discussing drafting
and enactment process); Carrington, A Foreword to the Study of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 14 Wyo. L.J. 17, 18-20 (1959) (U.C.C. "the most thoroughly considered statute ever
proposed for enactment").
82. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND THE
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, General Comment to AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 81,
at xv-xvii (uniformity to be achieved through viewing U.C.C. as integrated whole);
Rockefeller, Governor's Memorandum of Approval, reprinted in 1 N.Y.U.C.C. xiii-xv
(McKinney 1964) (New York adoption of U.C.C. "a major step toward enactment of a
single uniform body of commercial law throughout the United States"). Achieving uni-
formity of creditors' remedies was considered one of the Code's accomplishments. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 3 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-101, Comment (1976) (goal of Code "to provide a simple and unified structure within
which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward
with less cost and with greater certainty").
83. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, supra note 81, § 1-102(3) & Comment 2.
84. Id.
85. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected Flagg Brothers' con-
tention that Brooks was bound by the "Combined Uniform Household Goods Bill of
Lading and Freight Bill" that she received several days after her furniture had been
moved and stored pursuant to an oral agreement. That document "in minute print
referred to sale by the warehouseman in the event of nonpayment of storage charges."
Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764, 767 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436
U.S. 149 (1978). The oral agreement extended only to the price of the transaction and
ignored the question of remedies. Id. at 767.
86. With the exception of one provision that the Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional, the plaintiff in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), could not show
that the liquor regulations had any impact on the members' decision to discriminate. Id.
at 175. Similarly, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the tariff
provisions pointed to by the plaintiff did not specifically authorize the exact actions
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the regulations directly encouraged those aspects of the activity chal-
lenged as unconstitutional.
1. Legitimation of an Unconstitutional Procedure
By explicitly authorizing Flagg Brothers to act as it did, section 7-210
legitimated those actions. The length and detail of the statute,8 7 and
the specific and positive terms in which its provisions are couched,
belie the claim that it merely authorizes a self-help remedy without
encouraging its use.s8 Though designed to facilitate private action, the
Code confines such action within carefully circumscribed bounds. Its
precision evinces the comprehensiveness with which private ordering
has been supplanted by governmental influences.89
2. Replacement of Private Ordering
In addition to the Code's specific legitimation of unconstitutional
actions by private individuals, the governmental framework within
which section 7-210 operates-the U.C.C.-encourages the use of those
procedures. By erecting procedural and financial barriers to the use of
alternative procedures, the Code reflects and effectuates the intention
that individuals utilize the authorized, but constitutionally defective,
procedure instead of establishing their own.90
taken or explicitly favor one construction of the challenged provision over another. Id.
at 346 n.l. Moreover, the procedure was never specifically approved by the state and
may have been inserted into the tariff unnecessarily. Id. at 354-55.
By contrast, § 7-210 explicitly details the very aspects of the sale provisions that Brooks
was challenging: the notice and hearing requirements. See note 88 infra. The section
was specifically approved by New York State when it enacted the New York U.C.C. after
completion of a three-year, six-volume study. See Rockefeller, supra note 82, at xiii-xiv.
87. The statute begins by authorizing warehousemen to enforce liens on stored goods
by public sale "in a commercially reasonable manner." The next 2000 words define "com-
mercially reasonable manner."
88. Section 7-210 specifies exclusive enforcement methods. Section 7-210(2) begins: "A
warehouseman's lien . . . may be enforced only as follows .. " Moreover, its exclusive
provisions detail the very aspects of the procedure challenged by the plaintiff in Flagg
Brothers. Section 7-210(c) provides for ten days notice of the sale and specifies the form
that notice must take. The section does not provide for a presale hearing; a debtor can
obtain one only by seeking replevin, which requires the posting of a bond twice the
value of the goods held. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Even those courts that refuse to find state action in repossessions and sales made
pursuant to U.C.C. procedures acknowledge that the specificity of the statute encourages
use of the procedures by reducing creditors' risks; creditors know that if they adhere to
the detailed procedure, courts will uphold their actions. See, e.g., Northrip v. Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 28 (6th Cir. 1975); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607,
611 (6th Cir. 1974).
89. See note 75 supra (narrowing of choices indicates government control).
90. For purposes of the state action analysis, this Note has assumed that the procedures
provided by § 2-710 are constitutionally defective. Had the Court found state action pres-
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The most significant disincentive to individual adoption of alterna-
tive procedures is the presumptive inclusion of section 7-210 in private
contracts.91 This factor is aggravated by the parties' disparities in
knowledge and bargaining power. The debtor-the party likely to be
adversely affected by section 7-210's remedy-is unlikely to know of its
existence. 92 He will thus be unable to use the bargaining power avail-
able to him to modify the procedure.93 Because the creditor stands to
benefit from section 7-210, he will generally avoid sharing his knowl-
edge with the buyer for fear of objection to inclusion of the provision
ent and reached the merits in Flagg Brothers, it might have ruled that the self-help
procedures established in U.C.C. §§ 7-210 and 9-504 did not violate due process. Due
process doctrine with respect to summary remedies is in a state of flux. Compare North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 691 (1975) (summary remedy violates
due process) and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (ex parte replevin violates due
process) and Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (ex parte wage garnish-
ment violates due process) with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sum-
mary sequestration does not violate due process). Commentators have found untenable
the Court's distinctions between acceptable and flawed procedures. See, e.g., Catz &
Robinson, supra note 13, at 556-68; Steinheimer, Summary Prejudgment Creditors' Rem-
edies and Due Process of Law: Continuing Uncertainty After Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Company, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 79 (1975). A due process challenge to the U.C.C. self-
help provisions would present a new opportunity to resolve the disputed notice and
hearing issues. Catz & Robinson, supra note 13, at 570-72.
91. See note 83 supra.
92. See Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the
Underworld And a Proposed Salvation, 51 OR. L. REv. 302, 302-04 (1972) (suggesting
practical reasons for debtor's lack of knowledge); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of In-
equality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U.
TORONTO LJ. 359, 372-73 (1976) (discussing economic factors responsible for debtor's lack
of knowledge).
93. See Trebilcock, supra note 92, at 370-71 (applying economic theory to contract
model).
The issue of whether the availability of self-help repossession procedures is on balance
beneficial to the debtor class has been hotly debated. Compare Brabham, supra note 13,
at 191 (costs of self-help repossession outweigh benefits) and White, supra note 13, at 531
(same) with Yudof, supra note 13, at 967-72 (benefits outweigh costs) and Note, Creditor
Remedies: Providing Due Process at a Discount, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 143 (1975) (same).
The debate does not consider the relative cost of institutionalizing self-help remedies
instead of requiring that they be included in individual contracts. The unfairness arises
from a procedural defect; the failure of the parties to bargain over inclusion of the
provision means that its value to them is not taken into account in the contract price
and that the debtor thereby suffers a hidden price increase.
Requiring contractual agreement upon summary creditors' remedies is not a novel
proposal. See Anderson, A Proposed Solution for the Commercial World to the Sniadach-
Fuentes Problem: Contractual Waiver, 78 Com. L.J. 283, 286-87 (1973) (suggesting Fuentes
requires post-default waiver of hearing). Commentators have differed as to the efficacy of
such requirements. Compare White, supra note 13, at 509 (no one reads contract clauses)
with McCall, supra note 13, at 407 (knowing waiver valuable in most cases) and Note,
supra note 30, at 771 (without statute authorizing creditors' self-help, creditors would
need conspicuous, separately signed agreements to authorize summary remedies). Never-
theless, elimination of the presumptive inclusion of self-help remedies would certainly
help those debtors who, like Brooks, had entered into oral agreements.
State Action
in the contract.94 By providing that silence will result in the section's
inclusion, the state has effectively encouraged creditors to utilize the
state-established procedure.
The government's involvement in self-help repossession, through
establishment of a procedure by which warehousemen can convert
their liens into good title, satisfies the significant state-involvement,
close-nexus test. The government's control of the commercial con-
tracting process is pervasive and has a significant impact on private
contractual agreements. 5 By promoting procedures that fail to com-
port with constitutional norms, the state violates the due process
clause.
B. The Permissiveness Fallacy
The Court's failure in Flagg Brothers to recognize the nexus between
the governmental framework and the process of dispute resolution
stemmed in part from the posture of the case. Flagg Brothers was
94. See Trebilcock, supra note 92, at 372-73 (nondisclosure is in creditor's economic
interest).
95. The significance of the U.C.C.'s impact varies among jurisdictions. Although it
merely codified common law rights in some, in others it granted warehousemen wholly
new powers. Compare Cox Bakeries of N.D., Inc. v. Timm Moving & Storage, Inc., 554
F.2d 356, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1977) (§ 7-210 constitutes state action in North Dakota because
prior to U.C.C. sheriff enforced foreclosure of warehousemen's lien) with Melara v.
Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1976) (§ 7-210 not state action because California
permitted private enforcement of warehousemen's liens for over century). See McCall,
The Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973)
(tracing uneven history of self-help remedies). Irrespective of its initial impact, the U.C.C.
has a continuing impact on private ordering: creditors rely upon, and take advantage of,
its provisions. See, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 157 (3d Cir. 1977) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring) (garageman's lien enforced under color of state law); Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974)
(creditors acted with knowledge of and pursuant to statute); id. at 340 (Byrne, J., dissent-
ing) (bank relied on state law to repossess).
Notwithstanding judicial rhetoric about the benefits to debtors of state regulation of
creditor's remedies, see, e.g., Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 27
(6th Cir. 1975); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1039 (1974), many commentators have concluded that the net effect of the U.C.C. is to
increase the number of self-help repossessions, see, e.g., Catz & Robinson, supra note 13,
at 582-83 (U.C.C. encouragement more overt than encouragement in Reitman); Clark,
supra note 92, at 306-18 (U.C.C. is anticonsumer); Note, supra note 30, at 770-72 (repos-
session statutes encourage surprise repossessions).
Supporters of the self-help provisions contend that private arrangements would be
similar to those authorized by the U.C.C. and that the U.C.C.'s impact on private order-
ing is thus not significant enough to warrant imposing constitutional restrictions upon
the procedure. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 162 n.12 (1978). That claim ignores
the economic benefits to the creditor from presumptive inclusion of the provisions. More
important, the fact that private parties might have adopted procedures that violate due
process norms does not justify allowing the state to promote such procedures; that
reasoning would suggest that Jim Crow laws were tolerable because blacks and whites
would have ridden in separate train cars even absent the laws.
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susceptible to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 198396 only if its actions
were attributable to the state.97 Accordingly, the Court began its in-
quiry by focusing on that question.98 The Court canvassed and rejected
three bases for such attribution: that Flagg Brothers' actions could be
traced to the involvement of a state official, that the actions amounted
to performance of a public function, and that the state had so en-
couraged the actions as to be responsible for them.
99
The Court's analysis of the first two bases, though arguably incor-
rect,100 nevertheless found substantial precedential support. But in
addressing the state-encouragement argument, the Court elevated to
critical importance a hitherto insignificant feature: the permissive
nature of the state's involvement.
101 The Court's concentration on
whether Flagg Brothers' conduct was attributable to the state led to
the conclusion that Flagg Brothers' voluntary decision to use section
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (giving victims right of action against civil rights violators).
97. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 153-56 (1978).
98. Id. at 157 ("Thus, the only issue presented by this case is whether Flagg Brothers'
action may fairly be attributed to the State of New York.")
99. Id. at 157-66.
100. The Court could easily have found state action under the official-action or public-
function theories. The Court might have held that the marshal's involvement in trans-
ferring the property implicated the state, insofar as the warehousemen's subsequent im-
position of a lien and the ultimate threat of sale followed directly from that transfer. See
note 24 supra (explanation of official action doctrine); Stypmann v. City & County 
of
San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1977) (imposition of garageman's lien sub-
sequent to towing of car at request of state police officer was state action); Tedeschi v.
Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34, 41-42 (D. Conn. 1976) (same).
The ruling that nonconsensual transfer of property does not constitute a public func-
tion was equally questionable. Though the Court attempted to justify that conclusion
on historical grounds, 436 U.S. at 161-62, it implicitly recognized the inadequacy of the
distinction elsewhere in the opinion, see id. at 163. After holding that nonconsensual
transfer was not a public function because it was not a duty reserved exclusively to the
state, id. at 161, the Court explicitly reserved judgment as to the public nature of "such
functions as education, fire and police protection, and tax collection," id. at 163, some of
which have never been performed exclusively by the state, see, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middle-
bury Vol. Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (private voluntary fire department as
state action). Moreover, the Court's argument was historically inaccurate; at least in New
York, lien enforcement was traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state sheriff.
436 U.S. at 167-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The basic problem with the public function decision was less the Court's reasoning than
the doctrine itself. Some public function cases have rested on explicit legislative directives.
See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-
03, 110 (1973) (congressional directive that editorial function remain in private hands);
Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 31-32 (6th Cir. 1975) (foreclosure
of federal mortgages purposely excluded from federal control). Others, however, have
rested simply upon the judge's opinion of what constitutes a public function. See, e.g.,
Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 45-47 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974) (distraint is public function).
101. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (U.C.C. permitted but did not
compel Flagg Brothers' actions); Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 810 &
n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (Flagg Bros. holds state action exists only if state compels private act).
State Action
7-210 absolved the state of responsibility for the repossession. 02 The
Court emphasized the similarity between Flagg Brothers' actions and
traditional private repossession remedies in order to buttress the illu-
sion that Flagg Brothers' decision was its own and not the govern-
ment's.1
03
The dichotomy between mandatory and permissive state frame-
works was a false one. The Court had rejected that dichotomy as far
back as its decision in Smith v. Allwright.104 Since 1940, the test of the
sufficiency of the state's involvement has turned on the significance of
its effect on private ordering. Compulsion is the most extreme effect.
But both practically and theoretically, government intrusion into
private ordering can exist as readily in a permissive as in a mandatory
environment.10 5 Given a sufficiently encouraging governmental frame-
work, an independent private choice can reflect governmental priori-
ties as certainly as if that choice had been mandated by the state. 00
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens was the only opinion in
Flagg Brothers that isolated the real issue of the case: whether the
state's exercise of its power to "define and control" the transaction
warranted imposition of constitutional safeguards upon that transac-
tior. 107 If the significant state-involvement test is to remain meaning-
ful, the answer to that question must be, yes. Like the activities pre-
sented in Moose Lodge and Jackson, the commercial transactions at
issue in Flagg Brothers are pervasively regulated by the state. 08 Unlike
the activities challenged in Moose Lodge and Jackson, the procedure
by which warehousemen convert liens into good title is also perva-
102. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978). The Court characterized the
state's involvement as a mere denial of judicial relief, implying that Flagg's choice to
execute the lien was reached without consideration of the statutory scheme.
103. Id. at 162 n.12 (proposed sale not significant departure from traditional private
arrangements).
104. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). The Court found Texas' permissive framework for political
primaries as conducive to racial discrimination as a mandatory framework and accord-
ingly held that it violated equal protection. Id. at 664-65. The mandatory/permissive
distinction flies in the face of other precedent. The Court found state action in Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961),
and Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), despite the fact that each in-
volved permissive frameworks; in none of those cases was the objectionable activity
mandated by the government. In fact, in Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (1956), the Court held that individual action made possible by the existence of a
permissive federal framework-granting unions the right to vote for closed shop-con-
stituted state action. Id. at 232.
105. See pp. 548-49 supra.
106. See note 65 supra (segregation encouraged by state framework).
107. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 174 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. See p. 554 sup ra.
559
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sively regulated by the state.10 9 That regulation, moreover, directly
encourages the due process violations complained of.110 It is an en-
couragement that cannot be deemed accidental."' The nexus between
state establishment of procedures and private invocation of them is
sufficiently close to call into play the safeguards of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
109. See pp. 554-55 supra.
110. See pp. 555-57 supra.
11I. See note 69 suPra (determination and relevance of motivation in state action
decisions). Not only does the U.C.C. supply the needed pervasiveness, but the states' bene-
fits from the existence of self-help remedies also establish the symbiotic relationship. See,
e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 342 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (economic and administrative
benefits flow to the state from self-help).
